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ARGUMENT 
The correctness of an argument is thankfully not measured by 
i t s vehemence . A p p e l l e e ' s b r i e f i s thus long on vigorous 
r h e t o r i c , but i t scarcely addresses the d i s p o s i t i v e i s sue s in 
t h i s case. In some ins tances , i t also does serious contor t ions 
with the record, which wil l be pointed out where appropria te . I t 
a l s o i s g u i l t y in many i n s t a n c e s of r e fu t ing A p p e l l a n t ' s 
arguments in the context of issues to which these arguments were 
not addressed. 
POINT I 
APPELLEE HAS IGNORED THE PACT THAT 
IN AN EQUITY CASEf THE COURT CAN 
REVIEW THE FACTS AND SUBSTITUTE ITS 
OWN FINDINGS WHERE THE TRIAL COURT 
HAS FAILED TO HAKE NECESSARY 
FINDINGS. 
The claimed def ic iencies in the marshalling of evidence, and 
Appellee's claims that the record supports the cou r t ' s f indings, 
w i l l be d i scussed in the p o i n t s to follow. As to Appellee 's 
claims regard ing the s tandard of review, Appel lant does not 
d i s p u t e tha t the Tr ia l Court ' s Findings of Fact are reviewable 
under Rule 52(a). Recent Supreme Court and Court of Appeals 
dec i s ions , however, have defined the term "c lea r ly erroneous" in 
Rule 52(a) as one where the Appel la te Court c o n c l u d e s t h e 
findings are against the clear weight of the evidence. Re id v, 
Mutual of Omaha Ins . Co., 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989), Maughan v. 
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Maughany 770 P .2d 156 (Utah C t . App. 1989 ) f Grimm v. Roberts, 
784 P.2d 1238 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). At least in terms of the 
language used by the c o u r t , the standard thus defined is 
expressed in the same terms as applied in equity cases for many 
years. 
Reviewing the findings that the Trial Court made is notf 
howeverf the main issue in this case. Appellant asserts that the 
Trial Court failed to make findings that deal with the material 
issues in this case, contentions which Appellee primarily skirts 
without response. See Appellant's Brief, pp. 6, 18, 27, 30, 34-
35. In Re id v. Mutual of Omaha cited above, the Supreme Court 
stated as follows: 
"Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure requires the Judge in a bench t r ia l 
to "find the f ac t s s p e c i a l l y and s t a t e 
separately i t s conclusions of law." Utah R. 
Civ. P. 52(a). The failure to enter adequate 
findings of fact on material issues may be 
reversible error. See, e.g., Acton v. J.B. 
Deliran Corp., 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987). 
The f i n d i n g s must be a r t i c u l a t e d with 
sufficient detail so that the basis of the 
ultimate conclusion can be understood. See, 
e .g . , i d . a t 999; Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 
423, 426 (Utah 1986); Rucker v. Dolphin, 598 
P.2d 1336, 1338-39 (Utah 1979)." 
Appellant's main brief intended to emphasize the fact that 
this is a case in equity. No case was found that holds that the 
changes in the Rules of Civi l Procedure e l iminated the 
distinction between law and equity matters. In fact, as pointed 
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out by the Appellee in i t s Brief, t h i s court has held that Rule 
52(a) applies to equi ty c a s e s . There fo re , equ i ty cases must 
s t i l l e x i s t , and the d i s t i n c t i o n must have some s igni f icance . 
Compare, for example Sawyer-Adecor In terna t ional v. Anglin, 646 
P.2d 1194 (Mont. 1982) where, although under a s t a tu t e and not 
t h e common law, the Montana Supreme Court demonstrated i t s 
approach to equity matters under Rule 52(a) at 646 P.2d 1198: 
Although the "c lear ly erroneous" standard of 
Rule 52 (a ) s t i l l a p p l i e s t o v e r b a t i m 
f indings , i t i s equally incumbent upon us to 
aPPlYr in appel la te review of equ i t y cases 
and proceedings of an equitable na ture , the 
rule tha t we review a l l ques t i ons of f ac t 
a r i s i n g upon the evidence presented in the 
record, whether the evidence i s alleged to be 
i n s u f f i c i e n t or n o t , and to determine the 
same, as well as questions of law. 
We submit that in an equity case under Rule 52(a) , as under 
e a r l i e r precedents, the court "may, where the occasion warrants , 
s u b s t i t u t e i t s own judgment for t h a t of the t r i a l court and 
fashion i t s own remedy according to the demands of j u s t i c e " . 
Jackson v. Jackson , 617 P.2d 338 (Utah 1980) . I t need not 
r e v e r s e and remand the m a t t e r to the T r i a l Court to make 
appropriate f indings. 
A l t e r n a t i v e l y , t h e r e i s no need for a remand to correct 
inadequate findings if there i s no real dispute concerning the 
m a t e r i a l fac ts and the appel la te court can f a i r l y and properly 
r e s o l v e the case on the record before i t . Flying Diamond Oil 
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Corp. v, Newton, 776 P.2d 618 (Utah 1989); Nab v. Nabf 757 P.2d 
1231 (Idaho 1988). 
There i s no s e r i o u s d i s p u t e in the evidence t h a t (1) the 
loan was to Granada and Larsen; (2) the loan was for Granada ' s 
working c a p i t a l ; (3) the p a r t i e s to the loan did not intend t h a t 
Bodenvest would have to pay i t ; (4) the loan was not intended to 
and did not b e n e f i t Bodenvest in any way; (5) the loan was not 
for appa ren t ly ca r ry ing on of the bus ines s of Bodenvest in t h e 
usual way; and (6) no evidence was presented t h a t the p a r t n e r s of 
Bodenvest knew any th ing a b o u t , c o n s e n t e d t o , or r a t i f i e d t h e 
Trust Deed. 
POIHT I I 
APPELLEE MAKES NO RESPONSE TO THE 
ISSOE OP LACK OP CONSIDERATION POR 
THE TRUST DEED. 
The T r i a l C o u r t m i s t a k e n l y i g n o r e d t h e i s s u e of 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n c o m p l e t e l y . A p p e l l e e c o n t e n d s t h a t A p p e l l a n t 
f a i l e d to "offer any evidence t h a t such an argument i s supported 
by the r eco rd" . Appe l l ee ' s Br ief , pp. 46-47. This i s not t r u e . 
A p p e l l a n t s Br ief , p . 16, s e t s fo r th record c i t a t i o n s t h a t show 
the re was no known b e n e f i t of any kind to Bodenvest. Mr. Apple, 
Granada ' s T r e a s u r e r , t e s t i f i e d as follows a t R. 1099, p . 212: 
Q. Now, do you know of any b e n e f i t 
w h a t s o e v e r t h a t B o d e n v e s t 
p a r t n e r s h i p r e c e i v e d , if any? 
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A. From the F o o t h i l l loan? None. 
Mr. Jensen , Granada 's Vice P r e s i d e n t who arranged the loan f 
t e s t i f i e d as follows a t R. 1099f pp . 135, 187: 
Q. From what you u n d e r s t o o d , was i t 
t h e i n t e n t t h a t Bodenves t would 
have to pay t h i s loan off? 
A. No. No, I j u s t understood we were 
meeting the b a n k ' s requirement for 
some c o l l a t e r a l . 
* * * 
Q. In o t h e r w o r d s , i t was a debt of 
Granada and you expected Granada to 
repay i t ; i s t h a t f a i r ? 
A. T h a t ' s c o r r e c t . 
Q. Okay. So I j u s t want to be c l e a r 
on t h i s r e c o r d , do you know of any 
b e n e f i t whatsoever , t h a t Bodenvest 
got out of having the land used to 
secure Granada loans? 
A. No. 
F o o t h i l l ' s l o a n o f f i c e r , when asked whether t h e r e was 
anything in the loan f i l e t h a t would i n d i c a t e any b e n e f i t to 
Bodenves t from t h i s l o a n , answered as fol lows a t R. 1098, pp . 
37-39: 
THE WITNESS [ G r a n t ] : " * * * Now y o u r 
ques t ion was, i s t h e r e i n f o r m a t i o n in h e r e 
t h a t shows any b e n e f i t to Bodenvest by t h i s 
loan . No t h e r e i s none t h a t I can f i n d . . . . " 
Appellee can c i t e no evidence to the c o n t r a r y because t he r e 
was none . A p p e l l a n t ' s B r i e f , p . 37 c h a r g e s t h a t F o o t h i l l 
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presen ted "no evidence t h a t the re was any d i r ec t or indirect 
benefi t of any kind contemplated for Bodenvest". Appellee makes 
no response to th i s claim. 
Appellee's contention that Bodenvest induced the Trust Deed 
is fatuous. The record is clear and Appellee has not disputed 
t h a t F o o t h i l l was given seve ra l a l t e r n a t i v e p o s s i b i l i t i e s as 
securi ty for the loan. Foothi l l i t s e l f " ins i s ted that i t be in 
f i r s t posi t ion on th i s c o l l a t e r a l " , and i t rejected the a l t e r n a t -
i v e s . ( A p p e l l e e ' s Br ief , p . 9 ) . The l a s t page of G r a n t ' s 
or ig ina l notes (Exhibit 32) shows that Foothil l knew t i t l e to the 
land was vested in Bodenvest from the beginning . Granada did 
whatever Foothil l required. Appellant 's Brief, p . 12; testimony 
of Jenson cited above. Had Foothi l l appropriately ins i s t ed , for 
example, on a l i e n on Granada's Plumtree property (one of the 
des igna ted sources of repayment) , F o o t h i l l would have been 
t o t a l l y repaid. Appellant 's Brief, p . 43. If anyone "induced" 
the Trust Deed, i t was Foo th i l l . 
POINT I I I 
APPELLEE PAILS TO REFUTE THE 
ABSENCE OF FINDINGS BT THE TRIAL 
COURT CONCERNING GRANADA'S 
AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE THE TRUST 
DEED. 
The question is whether the t r i a l c o u r t ' s findings support 
i t s conc lus ions t h a t the F o o t h i l l Trust Deed i s a " v a l i d , 
enforceable. . .encumbrance" upon the Bodenvest property and that 
6 
Foothi l l is en t i t l ed to a decree of foreclosure (Conclusion No. 1 
and part of No. 4 ) .1 
Appellee Foothi l l impl ic i t ly concedes in i t s Brief tha t at 
l e a s t Sections 48-1-6 and 48-2-9 U.C.A. (1953) control the issues 
r e l a t e d to G r a n a d a ' s a u t h o r i t y as the genera l pa r tne r of 
Bodenvest. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 12f 36, 38, and the footnote 
a t the bottom of p . 29 ) . Under the r e l e v a n t p r o v i s i o n s of 
Sections 48-1-6 and 48-2-9, the following are the centra l issues 
of fact that are crucia l to the d i spos i t ion of t h i s case: 
1. Was Granada's execution of the Foothi l l Trust 
Deed "for apparently carrying on in the usual way the 
bus iness of the partnership"? (Section 48-1-6(1) and 
( 2 ) ) . If n o t , was i t " a u t h o r i z e d by t h e o t h e r 
par tners"? (Section 48-1-6(2) ) . 
2 • Did t h e F o o t h i l l T r u s t Deed make i t 
impossible to carry on the o rd ina ry b u s i n e s s of the 
par tnersh ip ; and, if so, was i t "authorized" by a l l of 
the p a r t n e r s (§ 4 8 - 1 - 6 ( 3 ) ) , or did F o o t h i l l ob t a in 
"writ ten consent or r a t i f i c a t i o n of the specif ic act by 
1
 For convenience, the Trial Court ' s Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure were 
included in Appendix B of Appel lant 's o r ig ina l Brief. A copy of 
the t r a n s c r i p t con ta in ing the T r i a l C o u r t ' s Bench Ruling i s 
attached to th i s Reply Brief as Appendix A. 
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a l l t h e l i m i t e d p a r t n e r s " ? ( S e c t i o n 4 8 - 2 - 9 ( 2 ) ) . 
(Emphasis Added) . 
3. Was t h e F o o t h i l l T r u s t Deed an " a c t in 
con t r aven t ion of the c e r t i f i c a t e " or an a s s i g n m e n t of 
" r i g h t s in spec i f i c par tnership property for other than a 
partnership purpose." If sof did Foothi l l have the "writ ten 
consent or r a t i f i c a t i o n of the s p e c i f i c ac t by a l l the 
limited partners"? (Section 48-2-9(1) and (4 ) ) . 
4. Did Foothi l l have "knowledge of the fact that 
he [Granada] has no such authori ty"? (Section 48-1-6(1) 
and ( 4 ) ) . 
Appellee does not and cannot point to findings by the Trial 
Court that address these i ssues . On the issue of what the usual 
b u s i n e s s of Bodenvest was or whether the execut ion in the 
partnership name of the Foothi l l Trust Deed by Granada was for 
apparently carrying on of Bodenvest's business in the usual way, 
Appellee can only argue the record. Appellee's Brief, pp. 37-38. 
See Point IV, inf ra . 
A p p e l l e e ' s sole response to the fact that the Trial Court 
made no de t e rmina t ion t h a t Bodenves t ' s p a r t n e r s a u t h o r i z e d 
Granada to execute and d e l i v e r the Trust Deed i s the absurd 
argument t h a t i t was author ized by Bodenvest's c e r t i f i c a t e or 
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t h a t such a u t h o r i t y was impl ied in the c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s . 
Appellee fs Brief, pp. 27, 34-36. 
The Trial Court does not deal in any recognizable way with 
whether the par tners consented to the Foothi l l Trust Deed, and 
there was ce r t a in ly no evidence or finding of any wri t ten consent 
or r a t i f i c a t i o n of the Trust Deed by any of the par tners . See 
Point I .B. of Appellant 's Brief; Point I I I B, in f ra . 
These omissions are not necessar i ly remarkable in l i g h t of 
the Trial Court ' s Bench Ruling, which was grounded solely on the 
fac t t h a t Larsen signed the P a r t n e r s h i p Agreement for t h e 
or ig ina l limited par tners in 1976. See the t r i a l c o u r t ' s bench 
ruling in Appendix A to th i s Reply Brief and Finding No. 20. 
A. THE PROVISIONS OF BODENVESTVS CERTIFIC-
ATE DID NOT AUTHORIZE THE TRUST DEED. 
Appellee r e l i e s despera te ly in s eve ra l c o n t e x t s upon the 
g e n e r a l powers c o n t a i n e d in p a r a g r a p h 15 of B o d e n v e s t ' s 
Cer t i f i ca te for the proposit ion that Granada was au thor i zed to 
execute the Trust Deed and that Foothil l was not required to look 
after the use of the loan proceeds. Appellee 's Brief, pp. 1, 2, 
31 , and 35 . As the preamble to paragraph 15.2 s t a t e s , these 
powers were granted to the general partner as "appropriate to his 
management of the par tnership bus iness ." They empowered Granada 
to borrow money for the par tnersh ip , not set the partnership up 
as a g u a r a n t o r on someone e l s e ' s loan u n r e l a t e d to the 
9 
pa r tne r sh ip ' s business . These provisions are inapposite and were 
ignored by the Tr ia l Court. 
Appellee also c i t e s paragraphs 2.2 and 9.1 but does not say 
how those purport to authorize the Trust Deed. Appellee c i t e s 
only the f i r s t sentence of paragraph 9 . 1 . The full provision 
provides as follows: 
9.1 Management. The General Partner shall 
manage the s u b j e c t p r o p e r t y and the p a r t n e r s h i p 
a c t i v i t i e s . Since the p roper ty is undeveloped, the 
major respons ib i l i ty of the General Partner will be to 
negotiate a l l future sales of any par t or the whole of 
t h e s u b j e c t r e a l p r o p e r t y . There s h a l l be no 
management fee charged for the management services of 
the General Par tner . (Emphasis added). 
Paragraph 2.2 a u t h o r i z e s Bodenvest to engage in o t h e r 
b u s i n e s s . Bodenvest , in fac t , had no business other than the 
holding of the Bodenvest property. If a general partner could 
j u s t i f y m i s a p p r o p r i a t i n g h i s p a r t n e r s h i p ' s a s s e t s under a 
provision l ike Paragraph 2.2, i t would be open season on limited 
par tne rsh ips . This is obviously another r idiculous argument. 
B. APPELLANT DID MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE FOR 
AND AGAINST THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING 
NO. 2 0 , AND APPELLEE HAS NOT REFUTED 
APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT THAT THIS FINDING 
IS SILENT ON THE QUESTION OF GRANADA'S 
AUTHORITY. 
Our contention is that Finding No. 20 is factual ly against 
the clear weight of the evidence and i t begs the ques t ion of 
whether the Trust Deed was an au thor ized ac t of Granada or 
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whether the p a r t n e r s consented to Granada's ac t . Appellant 's 
Br ief , 3 3 - 3 6 . A p p e l l e e has not r e f u t e d e i t h e r of t h e s e 
content ions . 
There is no d i s p u t e t h a t the t r u s t e e s for the o r i g i n a l 
p a r t n e r s never went to the County to d i s c o v e r L a r s e n ' s 
unauthor ized ac t of s igning as the i r "administrator" in 1976. 
The Tr ia l Court ' s oral rul ing (Appendix A) makes i t clear that he 
did not consider that the par tners knew about Larsen 's shor tcu t . 
The cou r t ' s finding that the par tners "allowed" Larsen to sign 
for them i s , therefore , r e a l l y a legal conclusion following from 
these fac t s . If the point here is that the l imited par tners are 
estopped from denying they are l imi t ed p a r t n e r s , then i t is 
po in t l e s s - they have not denied that they a re . 
Had the C e r t i f i c a t e been presented to the pa r tne r s , they 
undoubtedly would have signed i t . The question to be answered 
i s , what difference does i t make as to Granada's s t a tu to ry and 
Cer t i f i ca te a u t h o r i t y whether the l im i t ed p a r t n e r s signed or 
whether Larsen signed for them? Appellee has not advanced any 
argument tha t answers t h i s quest ion. 
Under Finding No. 20, the c r i t i c a l factual proposi t ions in 
dispute are (1) whether Larsen in fact "was clothed with actual 
or apparent a u t h o r i t y on behal f of such l im i t ed p a r t n e r s in 
matters re la ted to Bodenvest" at the time he signed the Trus t 
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Deed for Granada in 1986 and (2) whether Larsen's act was within 
the scope of that au thor i ty . The legal proposition in dispute i s 
whether t h i s has any re levance one way or the other , s ince 
Foothil l never sought any action from the par tners , Larsen never 
acted in the F o o t h i l l t r a n s a c t i o n as the p a r t n e r s ' agent or 
adminis t ra tor , and the question of Granada 's a u t h o r i t y i s not 
addressed. 
The only evidence to mar shal l supporting Finding No. 20 as 
i t r e l a t e s to Larsen's author i ty to act for Bodenvest's par tners 
i s , as s ta ted in the finding i t s e l f , exclusively the fact that 
the 1976 Bodenvest C e r t i f i c a t e on f i l e with the county bears 
Larsen's signature as the wAdm[inistrator]" for the then limited 
par tners . See Appellant 's Brief, p . 33; Exhibit 36. 
F o o t h i l l has no t d i s p u t e d A p p e l l a n t ' s c l a im t h a t i t 
presented no other evidence t h a t Larsen was or r e p r e s e n t e d 
himself to be an authorized agent for any of the limited partners 
of Bodenvest when t h i s t r a n s a c t i o n o c c u r r e d in 1 9 8 6 . 
(Appel lant ' s Brief, pp. 34-35; See also p . 6 ) . Nor has Foothil l 
pointed out any such evidence in the facts i t claims support t h i s 
f inding. (Appellee 's Brief, pp. 26-29). 
The Court of Appeals has held that when reviewing a T r i a l 
Cour t ' s finding based solely on writ ten mater ia ls and involving 
no assessment of witness r e l i a b i l i t y or competency, i t i s in as 
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good a p o s i t i o n as the Tria l Court to examine the evidence de 
novo and determine the facts rather than determine whether the 
T r i a l C o u r t ' s f i nd ings are "c lear ly erroneous". In re Infant 
Anonymous, 760 P.2d 916 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Appellant pointed out the evidence that convincingly refutes 
th i s finding. From the same county records upon which the Trial 
Court r e l i e d , as can be seen by the Ce r t i f i c a t e Amendment in 
Appendix B to Appellee's Br ief , by 1984 a l l but t h r e e of the 
o r i g i n a l par tners had been replaced by other par tners for whom 
there i s no county record showing Larsen as ever s igning in a 
representa t ive capaci ty . Further changes were made in the makeup 
of par tners in l a t e r years . Appellee 's answer to th i s point is 
embarrassed s i l ence . Appellant also brought on Trustees for one 
of the or ig ina l l imited partners who t e s t i f i e d tha t Larsen was 
never, a t any time, the i r adminis t ra tor . 
A p p e l l e e a r g u e s in s u p p o r t of F i n d i n g No. 20 t h a t 
Bodenves t ' s p a r t n e r s l e f t the management of Bodenvest in the 
hands of Granada and tha t they never asked to review or audit the 
p a r t n e r s h i p books. Appellee 's Brief p . 7, 27, 28. Appellant 
spec i f i ca l ly refutes the asse r t ions by Appellee in paragraph 16 
and 18 of i t s Statement of Facts and on page 27, tha t the record 
c i t a t i o n s t he re quoted e s t a b l i s h t h a t Bodenves t ' s " l i m i t e d 
p a r t n e r s r e a l i z e d t h a t they had not s igned the Limi ted 
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Partnership Agreement", or that they " le f t the matter of taking 
care of par tnership documents and administering the par tnersh ip 
to Larsen" , or t h a t they "turned pa r tne r sh ip a f fa i r s over to 
Larsen en t i r e ly and abdicated any respons ib i l i ty for control l ing 
or policing Larsen and Granada". 
We fa i l to see what these issues have to do with Finding No. 
20, and th i s attempt to sh i f t blame for F o o t h i l l ' s predicament 
from Foothil l to Bodenvest's par tners is completely unwarranted. 
Limited partners are required to leave management in the hands of 
the genera l par tner . Paragraph 14.1 of the Cer t i f i ca te s t a t e s 
that a limited partner "shal l take no part in or in ter fere in any 
manner wi th the conduct or con t ro l of the bus iness of the 
par tnership" . There was no need for the p a r t n e r s to ques t ion 
Granada or look at the books. They thought everything was fine f 
even while Foothi l l knew what was going on. As s t a t ed by Dr. 
Stevensen, one of the Pa r tne r ' s Trustees at R. 1100f p . 337: 
Q. (By Mr. Rappaport) But i t i s a 
fair s t a t emen t , though, t h a t you 
d i d n ' t have any complaint about 
what Dean Larsen or Granada was 
doing with r e s p e c t to Bodenvest 
un t i l such time as Granada f i l e d 
bankruptcy? 
A. No, we did not because we d i d n ' t 
know anything was long gone. We 
t h o u g h t i t was a p iece of land 
laying fully out there to be sold. 
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And everything would have been f ine , too, if Foothi l l and 
o t h e r s had not eage r ly a s s i s t e d Granada in m i s a p p r o p r i a t i n g 
Bodenvest's a s s e t s . 
Appe l l ee ' s Brief i s p a r t i c u l a r l y s i l e n t concerning whether 
Finding No. 20 supports the t r i a l c o u r t ' s legal conclusions even 
if i t were supported by the record. The finding does not mention 
Granada a t a l l or f ind t h a t the p a r t n e r s of B o d e n v e s t 
" a u t h o r i z e d " Granada to e x e c u t e the F o o t h i l l Trus t Deed. 
Appellee answers t h i s with only a footnote (Appellee's Brief, p . 
29), wherein i t advances the c i rcu la r argument that there was "no 
q u e s t i o n " t h a t Granada had a u t h o r i t y under B o d e n v e s t 1 s 
C e r t i f i c a t e , a proposi t ion that not even the Trial Court could 
swallow. C l e a r l y , Appellee i t s e l f i s a t a l o s s to say how 
Finding No. 20 addresses the crucia l question under Sections 48-
1-6 and 48-2-9 of Granada's au thor i ty . 
Does Finding No. 20 address i t s e l f to the issue of consent 
or r a t i f i c a t i o n under t he Code S e c t i o n s ? I t d o e s n o t 
spec i f i ca l ly say so . In l igh t of how the Foothi l l Trust Deed has 
made i t t o t a l l y impossible for Bodenvest to carry on i t s usual 
business of holding the property for sale (and we submit should 
also be considered as an assignment of par tnership property for 
other than a par tnership purpose), Foothi l l had the burden under 
Section 48-2-9 of showing that a l l the par tners provided writ ten 
15 
consent to the specific act. Even if Appellee had proved that in 
1986 Larsen was in fact the pension administrator for all the 
partners of Bodenvestf it is a logical leap of absurd proportions 
to conclude without proof that he had apparent authority in that 
capacity to bind the partners by consenting to his own self-
dealing. Administrators of pension trusts are normally charged 
with accounting responsibilities and do not have decision-making 
powers of trustees. And where are the written consents signed by 
Larsen for the partners? 
Appellee argues that Foothill could not inquire or obtain 
consent from Bodenvest's partners because Larsen had signed for 
the Partners. "There was no one else of record to ask". This is 
more nonsense. First, as has been made clear, Larsen has never 
purported to sign for most of the limited partners of record when 
this loan was made in 1986. Second, all of the names and 
addresses of the limited partners are there in the county file as 
part of the Certificate Amendments. Third, all Foothill had to 
do to protect itself was require that Granada provide the 
necessary written consents from the limited partners. Better 
yet, Foothill could have confined itself to the property of 
Granada and Larsen as security for the loan. 
Finally, if the Trial Court was addressing itself in Finding 
No. 20 to some kind of estoppel concept, that was not an issue 
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addressed by the p a r t i e s a t t r i a l . Appellee has not refuted 
A p p e l l a n t ' s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t t h e r e was no e v i d e n c e of any 
d e t r i m e n t a l r e l i a n c e by Footh i l l on Larsen 's signature on the 
1976 document. There was no evidence t h a t Larsen purpor ted 
himself to have author i ty from the par tners or as acting on their 
behalf. The record i s s i l e n t . 
C. ANY POWER OF ATTORNEY POSSESSED BY 
BODENVEST'S GENERAL PARTNER, IP IT 
E X I S T S , DID NOT AUTHORIZE THE TRUST 
DEED. 
In i t s Brief, pp. 6 and 32, Appellee a s se r t s tha t Granada 
was an a t to rney- in - fac t for the par tners of Bodenvest, c l e a r l y 
implying that the power of a t torney authorized t h i s t r ansac t ion . 
This new argument i s untrue and i n a p p r o p r i a t e l y r a i s e d by 
Appellee. The purpose of the power of a t torney is described in 
paragraph 23.1 of the C e r t i f i c a t e . I t r e l a t e s to s igning and 
f i l i ng of necessary par tnership papers with the S t a t e . Appellee 
presented no evidence that the powers of at torney provided for in 
the Cer t i f i ca te were ever prepared or executed by the par tners or 
that they included the power to do anything other than what i s 
s tated in paragraph 23 .1 . 
D. FOOTHILL MISREPRESENTS THE RECORD THAT 
CLEARLY SHOWS THE GRANADA BOARD NEVER 
AUTHORIZED THE FOOTHILL TRUST DEED. 
Foothi l l admits t h a t Granada 's Board of D i r e c t o r s never 
approved the F o o t h i l l Trus t Deed in a Mformaln board meeting 
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"invoked pursuant to not ice" , but a s se r t s that the d i rec to r s and 
off icers met, discussed, and "authorized th i s t ransaction" in a 
regular ly scheduled weekly meeting. Appellee's Brief, pp. 9-10. 
This is in d i r ec t c o n f l i c t with the A p p e l l a n t ' s s ta tement of 
f a c t s r e ly ing on the same t r a n s c r i p t c i t a t i o n s . Appellant 's 
Brief, p . 16. 
Resort to the t r ansc r ip t shows tha t both Jensen and Apple 
confirm that the Bodenvest Trust Deed was not discussed at e i ther 
the Board or Executive Committee Meetings of Granada, tha t Apple 
was unaware if i t , and that Jensen was simply doing what he was 
told by Larsen as an employee of Granada. 
Apple t e s t i f i ed as follows at R. 1099, p . 209-210: 
Q. All r i g h t . Now, was the fact that 
Bodenvest property was going to be 
used to secure that loan discussed 
in your committee meetings? 
A. No. I think that that had nothing 
rea l ly to do with i t . Wayne would 
u s u a l l y go out and t a l k with the 
banks and d e t e r m i n e what t h e y 
needed, and then we would t ry to 
meet t h a t n e e d ; d i d n ' t h a v e 
a n y t h i n g n e c e s s a r i l y to do with 
Bodenvest , o t h e r than i t was a 
property tha t was avai lable because 
i t was in f a i r ly good shape. 
Q. I s i t your understanding that you 
took any kind of board ac t ion as 
t h e members of t h e Board of 
Direc tors , to authorize Granada to 
p l e d g e Bodenves t p r o p e r t y , to 
secure tha t loan? 
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h. No. As to number 2, t h e r e i s no— 
you keep r e f e r r i n g to "Board of 
D i r e c t o r s " . T h e e x e c u t i v e 
committee met as o f f i c e r s of t h e 
company. Board of D i r e c t o r s met 
once a yea r . I mean, we d id no t 
meet of ten as d i r e c t o r s . We met as 
o f f i c e r s of the company on a weekly 
b a s i s . 
Q. W e l l , l e t me ask you, do you fee l 
l i k e you ever au thor ized Granada to 
e x e c u t e d o c u m e n t s p l e d g i n g 
Bodenvest p r o p e r t y to s e c u r e t h e 
F o o t h i l l debt? 
A, No. 
Q. Were you aware t h a t i t had taken 
p lace? 
A. With F o o t h i l l , no . 
Jensen t e s t i f i e d as fol lows a t R. 1099, p . 130-131, 184: 
Q . . . N o w , a s you t a l k e d wi th Mr. 
Grant about these p o s s i b l e ways to 
s e c u r e t h i s l o a n , had you a l r e a d y 
worked t h i s out with the board of 
d i r e c t o r s of Granada as to what 
would be a v a i l a b l e to secure i t , or 
i s t h i s something t h a t you had to 
go back and work on; do you r e c a l l ? 
A. I t h i n k more than l i k e l y t h i s i s 
something t h a t I v i s i t e d with Dean 
a b o u t , a b o u t w h a t c o u l d b e 
a v a i l a b l e f o r c o l l a t e r a l , 
a n t i c i p a t i n g - - I mean i t was 
normal if I am going to ask for a 
loan I am going to ask for a source 
of repayment or c o l l a t e r a l . I know 
t h a t before I make the phone c a l l . 
Q. Did you do t h a t s tudy or were you 
t o l d b y s o m e b o d y w h a t w a s 
a v a i l a b l e ? 
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A. I was aware of a l l of these and I'm 
p o s i t i v e t h a t I — I wouldn ' t take 
an a c t i o n l i k e t h i s w i t h o u t 
v i s i t i n g with Dean. 
Q. Now, you t e s t i f i e d t h a t you thought you 
were au thor ized in doing the t h ings t h a t 
you d i d w i t h r e g a r d to the F o o t h i l l 
loan? 
A. T h a t ' s c o r r e c t , 
Q. Now, by t h a t , were you—I want to 
draw a d i s t i n c t i o n be tween wha t 
Granada i s l e g a l l y au thor ized to do 
on Bodenves t ' s behalf as opposed to 
w h a t y o u t h o u g h t y o u w e r e 
au thor ized to do as an employee of 
G r a n a d a . Now, were you a t a l l 
address ing yourse l f in the answers 
t o t h o s e q u e s t i o n s to the l e g a l 
a u t h o r i t y of Granada to do t h i n g s 
on behal f of Bodenvest? 
A. As far as me having l ega l a u t h o r i t y 
t o do s o m e t h i n g , I l e f t t h a t 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n to Dean and to the 
bank a c c o r d i n g to what documents 
they had accepted or not accep ted . 
When I s a i d I t h o u g h t I had t h e 
a u t h o r i t y , I meant by Dean saying 
he wanted me to go do something, I 
intended t h a t he was g iv ing me the 
a u t h o r i t y to r e p r e s e n t him in going 
to the bank, fol lowing through. 
F i n a l l y , the formal r e s o l u t i o n obtained from Granada a f t e r 
the loan was made does not con ta in a u t h o r i t y to execute documents 
for Bodenvest. See A p p e l l a n t ' s Br ie f , p . 36 and Appendix B. 
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POINT IV 
A P P E L L E E S U B S T A N T I A L L Y 
MISREPRESENTS THE RECORD TO SUPPORT 
ITS ARGUMENT THAT BODENVEST WAS IN 
THE BUSINESS OP BORROWING MONEY. 
The Tr ia l Court was ce r t a in ly not persuaded that Bodenvest 
was in the bus iness of "borrowing money"f and Bodenvest was 
c e r t a i n l y n e i t h e r borrowing nor lending money when Granada 
encumbered i t s land for the Petersen, Luddingtonf and Foothi l l 
t r ansac t ions . Bodenvest could have been a finance company, and 
the Foothi l l Trust Deed would s t i l l not have been for carrying on 
i t s business . I t was issued to carry on Granada1s bus iness . 
Appellee f never the less , continues to cl ing to th i s nonsense 
argument, ser iously misrepresenting the record in the p r o c e s s . 
In paragraph 22 of i t s Statement of Facts , Appellee claims tha t 
" i t is undisputed that Bodenvest engaged in a s e r i e s of loan 
t ransac t ions whereby i t borrowed and lent money to various other 
par tnerships control led by Granada." In paragraph 24, Appellee 
a s s e r t s tha t these loans affected Bodenvest's accounting records 
because Bodenvest "recognized in t e r e s t income" in 1984, 1985, and 
1986. On page 37, i t a s se r t s that the "record suggests that the 
usual business of Bodenvest, Ltd. included numerous loans to and 
borrowings from other Granada c o n t r o l l e d - e n t i t i e s by Bodenvest." 
And on page 38, Appellee a s s e r t s t h a t " [ w ] h i l e Bodenves t 
attempted to argue that i t s accounting records were unaffected by 
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those t ransact ions and Bodenvest had no need to borrow moneyf the 
fac t i s t h a t Bodenvest acc rued i n t e r e s t r e s p e c t i n g t h e s e 
t r a n s a c t i o n s (see Statement of Facts above, paragraphs 18 and 
23) ." 
Appellee is gu i l ty here of mixing a number of facts together 
to c r e a t e a t o t a l l y mis leading p i c t u r e . The f a c t s a re as 
follows: 
1. P r i o r to e s t a b l i s h i n g a s epa ra t e " i n t e r o f f i c e 
loan" account in the ea r ly 1 9 8 0 ' s , Granada used the 
dormant Bodenvest checking account for a number of 
loans between various other par tnerships controlled by 
Granada. I t was Granada, not Bodenvest, tha t was the 
borrower and the lender on these loans, and they were 
not recorded in Bodenvest's books. Appellant 's Brief, 
pp. 7-8. 
2. In 1980 and ea r l i e r Larsen arranged to borrow from 
Luddington for two other partnerships Granada cont ro l -
l e d . These l o a n s and the q u a r t e r l y payments to 
Luddington were for some r e a s o n run t h r o u g h t h e 
Bodenvest accounts as of fse t t ing debi ts and c r e d i t s . 
Both of these loans were apparently repaid to Ludding-
ton and are no longer on Bodenvest's books. Offsetting 
i n t e r e s t income and i n t e r e s t expense i t ems were 
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r e c o r d e d on Bodenvest 1s books for these t r a n s a c t i o n s . 
A p p e l l a n t ' s Br ie f , p . 9, 15 . 
3, Granada used the Bodenves t p r o p e r t y to s e c u r e 
t h r e e l a rge p r i v a t e loans for Granada t h a t had nothing 
to do wi th Bodenves t - one in 1984 to EFF Fund from 
Luddington, one to Granada from P e t e r s e n s , and one to 
G r a n a d a from F o o t h i l l . They do n o t a p p e a r on 
Bodenvest 1s books and no i n t e r e s t income or expense was 
acc rued . A p p e l l a n t ' s Br ie f , pp . 9-16. 
A. Granada "borrowed" most of the proceeds from the 
s a l e of a pa rce l of Bodenves t ' s l and , which i s shown as 
a l a r g e " i n t e r o f f i c e loan" on Bodenves t ' s books. I t 
was t h i s " l o a n " , for which no loan documents e x i s t and 
for which no i n t e r e s t has ever been a c t u a l l y r e c e i v e d , 
t h a t accounted for almost a l l of the accrued i n t e r e s t 
income on B o d e n v e s t ' s books in 1984, 1985, and 1986. 
A p p e l l a n t ' s Br ie f , p . 9. 
T h u s , t h e o n l y t i m e Bodenves t t r u l y borrowed money was in 
connect ion with the o r i g i n a l purchase of the Bodenvest l and , and 
t h e o n l y t ime Bodenves t was t r u l y a lender (v ic t im) was when 
Granada helped i t s e l f to the p a r t n e r s h i p ' s cash., Bodenvest never 
borrowed money from any Granada p a r t n e r s h i p and was a lender to 
o n l y two s u c h p a r t n e r s h i p s , i f t h e e a r l i e r L u d d i n g t o n 
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t ransact ions are counted. Appellee's claim that i t is undisputed 
t h a t Bodenvest engaged in a " s e r i e s " of loan t r a n s a c t i o n s 
whereby i t borrowed and l e n t money to Granada e n t i t i e s i s , 
therefore , completely disputed and unsupported by the fac t s . 
We consider Finding No. 19 vague because i t appears to refer 
to the Granada i n t e r o f f i c e t r a n s a c t i o n s but does not mention 
e i t h e r Granada or Bodenvest . Appellee does not dispute that 
Foothi l l knew nothing about these t ransact ions and did not re ly 
upon them as r e p r e s e n t i n g the apparent business of Bodenvest. 
And they do not a l t e r the fact that the Foothi l l Trust Deed was 
for i t s e l f , not for carrying on Bodenvest's business/ regardless 
of what its business was. 
POIHT V 
APPELLEE IMPROPERLY SEEKS TO HAVE 
THIS COURT REFORM THE HYPOTHECATION 
STATEMENT. 
Finding No. 10 rea l ly finds only that Bodenvest agreed to 
encumber i t s property. The finding does not say that i t agreed 
to encumber i t s property for the Granada/Larsen note . If t h i s i s 
construed to mean that the Hypothecation Statement i s evidence 
t h a t B o d e n v e s t c o n t r a c t e d wi th F o o t h i l l to s e c u r e the 
Granada/Larsen n o t e , i t i s c l e a r l y in e r r o r because i t i s 
inconsis tent with the terms of the contract i t s e l f . 
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Appellee claims tha t we failed to marshall evidence of t h i s 
inconsistency. Again, t h i s cour t can read the Hypothecation 
Statement as eas i ly as the t r i a l court . Contract i n t e rp re t a t ion 
i s a question of law when ex t r ins i c evidence i s not re l ied upon 
for i t s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Bettinger v. Bettinger
 f 993 P. 2d 389 
(Ut . Ct . App. 1 9 9 0 ) . In c l e a r , unambiguous t e r m s , t h e 
Hypotheca t ion Statement i s not an agreement or consent " to 
encumber t h e B o d e n v e s t Rea l P r o p e r t y " to s e c u r e t h e 
Granada/Larsen note . I t i s an agreement to pledge Bodenvest land 
to secure loans to Bodenvest , a fac t s i t u a t i o n which i s not 
before the c o u r t . What Grant may have intended or thought i s 
i r re levan t to the in t e rp re t a t ion of t h i s con t rac t . 
A p p e l l e e a s s e r t s t h a t t h e r e "was t e s t i m o n y of t h e 
p o s s i b i l i t y of a mutual mistake" because some of i t s provisions 
had been whited out and typed over. Appellee 's Brief p . 25. The 
contract was in F o o t h i l l ' s f i l e , and i t s provisions are c l e a r . 
The t r i a l court made no finding that t h i s contract was in error 
or tha t i t was a l tered improperly, l e t alone tha t i t was based on 
fraud or a mutual mistake of the p a r t i e s . Appellee never sought 
reformation, and i t was not reformed by the t r i a l c o u r t . No 
i s sue of re format ion i s p rope r ly before t h i s c o u r t , and the 
con t r ac t s ' provisions stand as they a re . 
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POINT VI 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE 
TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT GRANT 
REVIEWED THE BODENVEST CERTIFICATE 
PRIOR TO THE FOOTHILL LOAN. 
Appellee claims that we failed to marshall the evidence in 
suppor t of the pa r t of Finding No. 10 tha t s t a t e s that Larry 
Grant reviewed F o o t h i l l ' s Cer t i f i ca te prior to execution of the 
Granada/Larsen Note. They claim that we failed to point out the 
portion of the t r ansc r ip t where Grant t e s t i f i ed that i t was his 
normal procedure to review a partnership c e r t i f i c a t e "whenever a 
partnership was involved in borrowing". 
While t h i s i s a minor p o i n t , t he r e are two th ings of 
importance to be emphasized. F i r s t , t h i s was not a loan that was 
processed under any kind of "normal procedure". I t was a rush 
loan , and i t i s not d i s p u t e d t h a t some of the i m p o r t a n t 
documentation for the loan was provided after the loan was made. 
More importantly, Appellee ignores the testimony of Grant that he 
did not consider Bodenvest to be the borrower and, therefore , did 
not concern himself with Bodenvest 's b u s i n e s s . His test imony 
that i t was his general prac t ice to review par tnership documents 
when a p a r t n e r s h i p was the "borrower" t h e r e f o r e seems to be 
se l f - se rv ing , i r r e l evan t testimony. Bodenvest was not a borrower 
and Grant c lear ly did not consider i t a borrower as shown in the 
testimony cited in Appel lant ' s Brief, pp. 25-26. 
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T h e r e f o r e , t h e r e was no evidence es tabl i sh ing that Grant 
reviewed Bodenvest's Cer t i f i ca te at a l l , e i ther before or af ter 
the loan was made to Granada and Larsen. 
If Grant had reviewed the partnership C e r t i f i c a t e , he would 
have been aware of the provisions of Paragraph 15.3, which should 
have put him on notice of Granada 's lack of a u t h o r i t y . That 
s e c t i o n p r o v i d e s t h a t "Bodenves t ' s genera l pa r tne r has no 
author i ty to : 
* * * 
B. Do any act which would make it impossible 
to carry on the ordinary business of the 
partnership; 
* * * 
D. Possess pa r tne r sh ip property or assign 
the r i g h t s of the p a r t n e r s h i p in s p e c i f i c 
p a r t n e r s h i p p r o p e r t y for o t h e r than a 
par tnership purpose. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellee has not pointed to any findings of the t r i a l court 
tha t es tab l i sh Granada's author i ty to bind Bodenvest to the Trust 
Deed under the re levant s e c t i o n s of the Code and Bodenves t ' s 
C e r t i f i c a t e . The t r i a l court erred as a matter of law in finding 
any signif icance in the fact tha t Larsen purported to sign the 
o r i g i n a l Bodenvest C e r t i f i c a t e as the a d m i n i s t r a t o r for the 
o r i g i n a l l i m i t e d p a r t n e r s . The T r u s t Deed was a c l e a r , 
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u n a u t h o r i z e d a c t of s e l f - d e a l i n g by Granada , and t h e r e a r e no 
c o n t r a c t s t h a t a r e b i n d i n g or e n f o r c e a b l e a g a i n s t B o d e n v e s t . The 
t r i a l c o u r t ' s J u d g m e n t and D e c r e e s h o u l d be r e v e r s e d w i t h 
i n s t r u c t i o n t o e n t e r Judgment in favor of Bodenves t and a g a i n s t 
F o o t h i l l "no cause a c t i o n " . 
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APPENDIX A 
1 trustee is missing from a trust deed, much less who is 
2 supposed to pay the debt, that in fact it is still Valley 
3 Mortgage, We are here criss-crossing as trustee as a 
4 mortgage. The fact it doesn't say who the loan was to, 
5 does not even validate the trustee even though a section 
6 of the statute wasn't perfectly followed. 
7 THE COURT: That is a Utah case? 
8 MR. RAPPAPORT: Yes, it is Court of Appeals, 
9 December 1988. 
10 THE COURT: Okay. 766 P.2d 429. This case the 
11 trustee line was left bank on a trustee. And the Court 
12 said that you can still go ahead and foreclose it as a 
13 mortgage. 
14 MR. RANDLE: I think that's about all that 
15 holds. I think it affirms you have to have a underlying 
16 obligations. 
17 MR. RAPPAPORT: Your Honor, there was an 
18 underlying obligations. 
19 THE COURT: All right. For the record, this is 
20 the case of Dean F. Luddington and others versus C. Dean 
21 Larsen and others. And the file number is C-87-3110. 
22 Well, seems to me that the critical documents 
23 in this case is Exhibit P-l, which is the same as Exhibit 
24 P-30 something; the partnership agreement. 
25 The thing that I think is critical about the 
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1 partnership agreement is that it was entered into years 
2 before this loan was filed in the County Clerk's office. 
3 And it bears a public document. And the limited partners 
4 allowed Mr. Larsen to sign as their trustee or 
5 administrator. And although they may not have received a 
6 copy of the documents, I really didn't hear any evidence 
7 as to whether they did or not. I guess they didn't. 
8 Even so, it was in the public record for all that time 
9 purporting to tell the world that this limited 
10 partnership was represented by Granada, Inc. C. Dean 
11 Larsen as the general partner and C. Dean Larsen as 
12 representative for all the limited partners. 
13 Seems to me that fact—by that fact the limited 
14 partners clothed Mr. Larsen with apparent authority to 
15 enter into agreements on their behalf. I think the 
16 statute, which is applicable in this case 48-1-6 where it 
17 says that every partner is an agent of the partnership 
18 for the purpose of apparently carrying on in the usual 
19 way the business of the partnership; provides that the 
20 general partner has apparent authority; that the 
21 partnership is going to be bound by it. 
22 I think that is a clear legislative choice to 
23 favor in this case where both the limited partners were 
24 innocent parties. The bank is an innocent party. I 
25 think it is a clear, legislative choice to favor the 
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1 outside business that deals with the partner rather than 
2 the partners themselves. They are in a better position 
3 to protect themselves. And in this case they could have 
4 done so by checking the public records and not clothing 
5 Mr. Larsen with apparent authority to act in their 
6 behalf. Consequently, I think the trust deed is a valid 
7 document. 
8 I don't think that the statute of frauds 
9 applies in this kind of a case, because I don't think 
10 this is really an agreement to answer for the debt of 
11 another. That's not what the statute of frauds is 
12 intended for. And I also reflect in argument involving 
13 the minor technical details of the trust deed and I think 
14 the trust deed is valid and affirm the validity. 
15 I will ask the—I will ask you, Mr. Rappaport 
16 and Mr. Poole, to prepare appropriate findings of fact 
17 and conclusions of law; submit them to Mr. Randle for 
18 approval as to form. 
19 MR. RAPPAPORT: Thank you, your Honor. 
20 THE COURT: Now, what about the rest of this 
21 case? Do you want to wait until after we are done with 
22 getting these documents ready before we talk about when 
23 we are going to try the rest of it? 
24 MR. POOLE: Well, I think bases upon our 
25 meeting in court's chambers, I think this will disposes 
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